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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the empirical relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance. Based on resource dependence theory, this study argues that the positive 
convergence-of-interests effect and the negative entrenchment effect can coexist in various 
industrial settings. Fixed-effect panel data regression models are applied to a sample of 1,156 
effective observations. To reflect the contextual role of resources, we defined industrial settings 
along with industrial complexity and firm scale dimensions. The empirical results supported our 
research hypotheses, showing that insider ownership exerts a positive effect on firm performance 
in a high-complexity and large-scale setting, but a negative effect in a low-complexity and small-
scale setting. The results of this study imply that contextual fitness must be deliberately considered 
to determine effective regulations of corporate governance. In addition, this study contributes a 
new aspect to related discussion, which synthesizes conflicting theoretical arguments by 
introducing the contextual role of resources. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ince Berle and Means (1932) introduced the concern that the separation of ownership and control might 
lead to agency problems, the ownership structure of firms has been debated in the management and 
finance fields. Insider ownership, one of the critical dimensions of ownership structure, is among the focal 
points of this debate and a suggested means to mitigate agency problems because high insider ownership can help 
align manager interests with shareholder interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; 
Jensen, 2000).  
 
However, empirical studies have not clarified the relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance. Competing theories still exist, including the convergence-of-interests argument and the entrenchment 
argument, which predict opposite performance consequences of insider ownership. More importantly, differences of 
social-legal contexts and their profound effects on ownership structure must be appropriately considered. Certain 
researchers have correctly noted that the widely held firms described in Berle and Means’ study do not reflect reality 
outside the United States and the United Kingdom (Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999). Even the world’s largest listed companies generally have a concentrated ownership structure (Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Lins, 2003). In European, Latin American, and East Asian countries, founding partners and 
their families might continue to control a company many years after its IPO. They and their intimate followers run 
the business as high-ranking managers and serve as board directors (Bozec, Rousseau, & Laurin, 2008; Roosenboom 
& Schramade, 2006). In this context, the agency problem subtly changes from being based on conflicting interests 
between managers and shareholders to being based on conflicting interests between inside owners (inside directors) 
and outside shareholders.          
 
This study investigated the relationship between insider ownership and firm performance in Taiwan, where 
the aforementioned context is typical. Following the perspective of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009), this study argues that differences in industrial setting must be considered. 
The two competing arguments were empirically examined in four industrial settings, defined according to industrial 
complexity and firm-scale dimensions, using fixed-effect panel regression models. The results showed that the 
S 
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entrenchment argument prevailed in a high-complexity and large-scale setting, whereas the convergence-of-interests 
argument prevailed in a low-complexity and small-scale setting. Accordingly, this study contributed a new aspect in 
the related discussion, arguing that the positive convergence-of-interests effect and the negative entrenchment effect 
might coexist in various industrial settings. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Insider Ownership and Firm Performance 
 
Berle and Means were the first to discuss the separation of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932). 
Since then, numerous theoretical and empirical studies have explored the consequences of ownership structure 
(Cullinan et al., 2012; Taboada, 2011; Delios et al., 2008; Patro, 2008; McConnell et al., 2008; O’Regan et al., 2005; 
Donnelly & Kelly, 2005). As an obvious characteristic of ownership structure, insider ownership has been 
repeatedly investigated. Nevertheless, empirical evidence does not provide support for one exclusive testable 
hypothesis regarding the effects of insider ownership.  
 
Two competing theories in the relevant literature involve the effects of insider ownership on firm 
performance. The convergence-of-interests argument suggests that high insider ownership aligns manager interests 
with those of outside shareholders, resulting in a positive effect on firm performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
asserted that managers are likely to become self-constrained and avoid to consuming perquisites when they hold a 
high stake in the firm because they must bear the costs of such activities in proportion to their shareholdings. A high 
insider shareholding can resolve the asymmetric information problem related to investment opportunities (DeAngelo 
& DeAngelo, 1985), reduce agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986), and mitigate managerial myopia (Palia & 
Lichtenberg, 1999). Wruck (1988) and Mehran (1995) also provided empirical evidence of the positive relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance.    
 
By contrast, the entrenchment argument suggests a negative effect of insider ownership on firm 
performance because high insider shareholdings shelter insiders from the market influence of corporate control 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Insiders tend to secure their positions, establish a business empire for their personal 
interests, and resist supervision (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). When insiders possess high shareholding, which increases 
their discretion and strengthens their positions, they tend to inflate their own power and damage internal supervisory 
rules to pursue their own interests (Morck et al., 1988; Gugler et al., 2008). 
 
In an attempt to synthesize the two rival arguments, a stream of articles has suggested a nonlinear 
relationship between insider shareholding and firm performance. However, the empirical results are diversified 
because of the inherent complexity of nonlinear models (Chou, 2013). For example, Morck et al. (1988) presented 
an N-shaped curve with two turning points to portray the relationship; Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) depicted the 
relationship as an M-shaped curve with three turning points; Cui and Mak (2002) observed a W-shaped curve with 
three turning points; Davies et al. (2005) specified a fifth-degree function with two maximal turning points and two 
minimal turning points; Selarka (2005) observed a U-shaped curve with one turning point; Hung and Chen (2009) 
obtained a V-shaped curve.  
 
Industrial Setting Effect 
 
Although agency theory, which is the basis for both of the aforementioned competiting arguments, is 
widely used in research on boards of directors and ownership structure, studies of resource dependence theory that 
relate external context to boards of directors provide a promising perspective to harmonize the competing theoretical 
arguments.  
 
Resource dependence theory characterizes the organization as an open system, dependent on contIngencies 
in its external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). Organizations 
constrained by their resource conditions attempt to reduce environmental uncertainty by increasing their control over 
vital resources (Ulrich & Barney, 1984). From the perspective of resource dependence theory, bringing in resources 
is exactly the organizational function served by boards and individual directors.   
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“Resource” is a broad term that includes all types of tangible or intangible items useful for firms. However, 
critical resources that constitute firm competitive advantage are typically heterogeneous, imperfectly mobile, and 
difficult to acquire in the market (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Crook et al., 2008). Board 
directors not only bring in capital (as a block shareholder) but also numerous intangibles. Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) named four types of resource that directors could bring in to benefit firms: (a) information in the form of 
advice and counsel, (b) access to channels of information between the firm and environmental contigencies, (c) 
preferential access to resources, and (d) legitimacy. All these items are clearly heterogeneous and unavailable in 
normal markets.      
 
There has been a huge body of literature exploring the relationship between board composition and external 
context. Mizruchi and Stearns (1988, 1994) provided empirical support for the relationship between firm’s need for 
financial resources and representation of financial institutions on their boards. Kor and Misangyi (2008) reported a 
negative relationship between the collective levels of industry experience in top management and the board, 
implying that the board supplements top management with critical knowledge and skills. Jones et al. (2008) reported 
that family firms pursuing diversification benefit from specific types of director. These research articles suggested 
that directors with specific types of resource assist firms in addressing their specific environmental context.    
 
Certain articles within this research stream are particularly revelant to the current study. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) observed that firms in regulated industries might require more outsiders, particularly those with 
relevant experience. Provan (1980) observed that firms that invite outside powerful members of the community to 
join their boards are more capable of acquiring critical resources from the environment than those who do not. 
Luoma and Goodstein (1999) observed that firms in highly regulated industries have a high proportion of 
stakeholder directors. Johnson and Greening (1999) observed that stakeholder directors are likely to improve 
corporate social performance. These studies have suggested that in specific contexts, having outsiders or 
stakeholders join the boards, which implies a lower insider ownership, benefits firms. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Based on resource dependence theory, this study argues that the convergence-of-interests argument and the 
entrenchment argument can coexist in various industrial settings. To reflect the contextual role of resources, we 
defined industrial settings along with industrial complexity and firm scale dimensions.  
 
To thrive in industries with a high-complexity context, where business circumstances are highly dynamic, 
technology and related knowledge progress at a rapid pace, or the vertical and horizontal relations among firms are 
intricate, firms tend to invite more outsiders or stakeholders to join their boards to obtain access to necessary 
heterogeneous resources. Besides, a high-complexity context inevitably magnifies information asymmetry and 
provides additional opportunities for insider entrenchment. This is particularly likely when insiders possess high 
ownership. Therefore, in a high-complexity context, high insider ownership tends to produce worse firm 
performance. This assertion is consistent with the entrenchment argument.  
 
Firm scale is an obvious contextual dimension related to resource demand. When firm scale is small, all 
types of resource demand are relatively easy to satisfy, either in terms of quantity or quality, which makes 
directorship typically only based on capital contribution. In addition, the  simple organizational hierarchy and the 
narrow business scope of small firm leave less room for insider manipulation. Therefore, in a small-scale context, 
high insider ownership tends to enhance firm performance. This assertion is consistent with the convergence-of-
interests argument. 
 
This theoretical deduction is synthesized in Figure 1, which shows that the negative entrenchment effect is 
predicted to prevail in a high-complexity and large-scale setting, whereas the positive convergence-of-interests 
effect is predicted to prevail in a low-complexity and small-scale setting. Therefore, we proposed the following two 
hypotheses. The other two settings are gray areas where the effect of insider ownership on performance is decided 
by contradicting strengthes along industrial complexity and firm scale dimensions.   
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Hypothesis 1: Insider ownership exerts negative effect on firm performance in a high-complexity and large-scale 
context. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Insider ownership exerts positive effect on firm performance in a low-complexity and small-scale 
context. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data and Sample 
 
The data used in this study were drawn from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. Annual data 
were collected from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2007 to avoid the effects of legal regulation revision. To 
ensure completeness of annual data, sample companies were restricted to those listed before January 1, 2004 and 
continuously listed through December 31, 2007. Sample companies were listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Corporation (TSEC) or were traded through the Over-the-Counter (OTC) Securities Exchange. Companies listed on 
the TSEC are typically larger in scale, whereas companies traded through OTC are smaller and typically in their 
early development stage. The current thresholds that have been listed on the TSEC constitute a contributed capital of 
at least 600 million TWD (approximately 20 million USD) and have been established and in operation for at least 3 
years. Therefore, the TSEC companies were labeled as “large-scale,” whereas OTC companies were labeled as 
“small-scale.”        
 
To account for industrial characteristics, this study compared technological and traditional industries to 
detect the effects from industrial complexity. In Taiwan, companies in the electronics and biotech segments are 
generally dynamic and R&D-intensive, and hence were labeled as “high-complexity”; companies in the relatively 
static and non-R&D-driven textile, steel, construction, food, chemical, and machinery segments were labeled as 
“low-complexity” to reflect their industrial characteristics. Effective observations totaled 1,156. The breakdown of 
effective observations were 320 in high-complexity and large-scale settings, 536 in low-complexity and large-scale 
settings, 168 in high-complexity and small-scale settings, and 132 in low-complexity and small-scale settings.   
 
  
Figure 1. Coexistence of Covergence-of-Interests and Entrenchment Arguements 
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Variable Definition and Measurement 
 
Insider ownership was the independent variable in this study. We defined insider ownership as the 
aggregate shareholding of directors and supervisors, a definition that is consistent with and comparable to that of 
existing studies. However, thanks to Taiwan’s minimum shareholding requirement for insiders, this study designed 
two additional measures to provide a richer observation of insider shareholding. Thus, the three measures of insider 
ownership used in this study were insider shareholding ratio (ISR), insider shareholding deviation (ISD), and 
frequency of insufficient shareholding (FIS). ISR is the aggregate shareholding of directors and supervisors over the 
weighted average outstanding common stock in a given year. This is a fundamental and commonly used measure of 
insider ownership. ISD refers to the difference between ISR and the legally required minimum shareholding ratio in 
a given year. ISD is a positive number when the aggregate insider shareholding is higher than the legal requirement. 
Conversely, a negative ISD shows that the aggregate insider shareholding falls below the legal requirement. FIS is 
the number of months a firm has filed as insufficient shareholding in a given year. According to Taiwan’s Security 
Exchange Act, all public companies must file their aggregate insider shareholding every month. Companies are 
fined if their aggregate insider shareholdings are lower than the minimum legal requirements. Thus, the value of this 
indicator ranges from 0 to 12, which is the number of times in a given year that a company is fined for insufficient 
aggregate insider shareholding. 
 
Earnings per share (EPS) and return on assets (ROA) were adopted as proxies of firm performance 
respectively, which is the dependent variable of this study. To identify the specific effect of insider ownership, two 
covariates were used to control statistically for confounding influences on firm performance. Leverage (LEV) 
denotes the ratio of total debts to total assets, which was included to account for the possibility that creditors are able 
to lessen managerial agency problems (McConnell & Servaes, 1995; Harvey et al., 2004). Duality (DUA) denotes a 
situation in which the board chair concurrently holds the position of general manger or CEO. Duality was dummy 
coded 1 if duality existed in a given year and 0 otherwise.    
 
Empirical Models 
 
The data used in this study included cross-sectional and time series longitudinal data of the years observed. 
The fixed-effect panel data models were adopted to examine the relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance as follows: 
 
                                                                   (1) 
 
                                                                   (2) 
 
Here,       and       are the regression dependent variables of company i (i = 1…n) at year t (i = 1…n); 
   through   are the parameters to be estimated, and     is the random error.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrices of independent variables, revealing 
that insider ownership structures differed among industrial settings. Companies in a low-complexity setting tended 
to have high ISR, high ISD, and low FIS, which implied high and stable insider shareholding. As presented in the 
table, the means of ISR and ISD for companies in a high-complexity and large-scale setting were 0.1563 and 0.1361, 
respectively. Both were lower than the figures for companies in a low-complexity and large-scale setting (0.1922 
and 0.1815, respectively). Similarly, the means of ISR and ISD for companies in a high-complexity and small-scale  
setting were 0.2169 and 0.1939, respectively; both were lower than the figures for companies in a low-complexity 
and small-scale setting (0.2479 and 0.1997, respectively). In addition, the low-complexity setting (Panel B and Panel 
D) had lower FIS (compared with Panel A and Panel C). This confirms that Taiwan’s listed companies in traditional 
industries typically develop from family-controlled businesses, and insider-owners of such companies tend to have 
high shareholding even after the IPO process.  
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Various insider ownership structures were also observed along the firm scale dimension. Small-scale 
companies (Panel C and Panel D) had a higher ISR (0.2169 and 0.2479, respectively) and a higher ISD (0.1939 and 
0.1997, respectively) than large-scale companies did (Panel A and Panel B). Small-scale companies also had a high 
FIS (0.6667 in Panel C and 0.3712 in Panel D). The statistics showed that Taiwanese insider-owners of small-scale 
companies tended to possess high shareholding and adjust their shareholding more frequently, which implied a high 
but unstable insider shareholding. 
 
Regarding the correlation matrices of independent variables in Figure 1, all of the four correlation 
coefficients of ISR and ISD were much higher than others with statistical significance, which implied that a severe 
collinearity might exist in the regression model. After running a variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis, the all-
variable-included mode of regression was excluded because of high VIF values on ISR and ISD (higher than 10). 
Instead, the regression models that included ISR (Mode A) and ISD (Mode B) were adopted in the following 
empirical analysis.   
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: high-complexity/large-scale 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
ISR ISD FIS DUA LEV EPS ROA 
ISR 0.1563 0.0872 1.0000 
      
ISD 0.1361 0.1426 0.8763
*** 1.0000      
FIS 0.2406 1.0835
 -0.1926*** -0.1629*** 1.0000     
DUA 0.3719 0.4841 -0.0501
 -0.1177** 0.0141 1.0000    
LEV 0.3793 0.1484 0.0779
 0.0820 0.0342 -0.0368 1.0000   
EPS 1.4999 2.9184 0.0523
 0.0149 -0.0899 0.0446 -0.2306*** 1.0000  
ROA 0.0442 0.1015 0.0612 -0.0014
 -0.0553 -0.0216 -0.3422*** 0.8800*** 1.0000 
Panel B: low-complexity/large-scale 
ISR 0.1922 0.1485 1.0000       
ISD 0.1815 0.2222 0.9002
*** 1.0000      
FIS 0.1063 0.7195 -0.0720
* -0.0748* 1.0000     
DUA 0.2519 0.4345 0.0557 0.0486 0.0158 1.0000    
LEV 0.4023 0.2305 0.1947
*** 0.0994** 0.1349*** -0.0091 1.0000   
EPS 0.7371 1.8591 0.1140
*** 0.1522*** -0.0432 -0.0002 -0.1891*** 1.0000  
ROA 0.0205 0.0638 0.2141
*** 0.2258*** -0.0890** -0.0574 -0.0490 0.8119*** 1.0000 
Panel C: high-complexity/small-scale 
ISR 0.2169 0.1430 1.0000 
      
ISD 0.1939 0.2704 0.9015
*** 1.0000      
FIS 0.6667 1.6764 -0.1267
 -0.1479* 1.0000     
DUA 0.4583 0.4998 0.0105
 0.0267 0.0905 1.0000    
LEV 0.4153 0.1842 -0.0943
 -0.1619** 0.0623 -0.0971 1.0000   
EPS -0.3144 2.6489 0.1257
 0.1730** -0.0749 -0.0343 -0.2797*** 1.0000  
ROA -0.0382 0.1733 0.2097
*** 0.2427*** -0.1369* -0.0238 -0.1700** 0.8348*** 1.0000 
Panel D: low-complexity/small-scale 
ISR 0.2479 0.1742 1.0000       
ISD 0.1997 0.2161 0.8869
*** 1.0000      
FIS 0.3712 0.9839 -0.0428 -0.0041 1.0000     
DUA 0.2727 0.4471 0.1584
* 0.1605* 0.0284 1.0000    
LEV 0.3963 0.2568 0.5825
*** 0.5019*** 0.1803** 0.1546* 1.0000   
EPS 0.9189 2.4479 0.1866
** 0.2404*** -0.3673*** 0.0010 -0.0085 1.0000  
ROA 0.0224 0.0964 0.1128 0.1053 -0.4278
*** 0.0073 -0.1281 0.8766*** 1.0000 
This table shows the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrixes of research variables in the four industrial settings. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2015 Volume 31, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 867 The Clute Institute 
Insider Ownership and Firm Performance 
 
The results of empirical analysis are presented in Table 2. EPS and ROA are the dependent variables used 
to perform fixed-effect panel data regression in empirical Models 1 and 2 respectively. The results of the two 
empirical models were relatively consistent, revealing a diverse relationship of insider ownership and firm 
performance among industrial settings. 
 
For companies in a high-complexity and large-scale setting, the results of empirical Model 1 present 
negative coefficients with statistical significance on ISR (-3.4299) and ISD (-1.6516). Similar results were obtained 
using empirical Model 2, which presented negative coefficients on ISR (-0.1835) and ISD (-0.0920) with statistical 
significance. These results suggested that high insider ownership exerts a negative effect on firm performance, 
which supports Hypothesis 1 and coincide with the entrenchment argument. 
 
Conversely, for companies in a low-complexity and small-scale setting, the results of empirical Model 1 
presented positive coefficients on ISR (9.9342) and ISD (1.5757) with statistical significance, and empirical Model 
2 presented positive coefficients on ISR (0.4937) and ISD (0.1604) with statistical significance. These results 
showed that high insider ownership exerts a positive effect on firm performance, which supports Hypothesis 2 and 
concur with the convergence-of-interests argument. 
 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the empirical results of FIS. Given that FIS is an indirect 
measurement observing insider shareholding from an opposite direction, high FIS implies low insider ownership. In 
Table 2, all the FIS coefficients in a low-complexity and small-scale setting are negative with statistical significance, 
which suggests a positive effect on firm performance. By contrast, in a high-complexity and large-scale settings, all 
the FIS coefficients were positive, although they did not reach statistical significance. 
 
Regarding the predicted gray areas, the high-complexity and small-scale setting and the low-complexity 
and large-scale setting, both empirical Models 1 and 2 presented positive coefficients on ISR and ISD with statistical 
significance, implying that a positive convergence-of-interests effect prevailed in the two settings. However, the 
positive FIS coefficients support the negative entrenchment effect. The conflicting results confirm the predictions 
presented in Figure 1. 
 
The empirical results of DUA showed diverse tendencies on large-scale and small-scale companies. For 
large-scale companies, the coefficients of DUA were all negative, whereas the DUA coefficients of small-scale 
companies were all positive, implying that the effect of the controversial CEO duality also contingents on industrial 
context. The empirical results of LEV were consistently negative for all the tested industrial settings, suggesting an 
inverse relationship between leverage and performance. 
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Table 2: Effects of Insider Ownership on Firm Performance in Different Industrial Settings 
Panel A: Empirical Model (1) – EPS as the dependent variable 
 High-Complexity/ 
Large-Scale 
Low-Complexity/ 
Small-Scale 
High-Complexity/ 
Small-Scale 
Low-Complexity/ 
Large-Scale 
 Mode A Mode B Mode A Mode B Mode A Mode B Mode A Mode B 
ISR 
-3.4229 
(0.0022) *** 
 
9.9342 
( 0.0000) *** 
 
9.4940 
( 0.0000) *** 
 
5.9776 
(0.0000) *** 
 
ISD  
-1.6516 
(0.0025) *** 
 
1.5757 
( 0.0137) ** 
 
6.0918 
( 0.0006) *** 
 
1.2041 
( 0.0927) * 
FIS 
0.0329 
( 0.5400) 
0.0414 
( 0.4308) 
-0.3971 
(0.0008) *** 
-0.4286 
(0.0006) *** 
0.2293 
( 0.0523) * 
0.2340 
( 0.1061) 
0.2211 
( 0.0405) ** 
0.1126 
( 0.0687) * 
DUA 
-0.2074 
(0.3004) 
-0.1946 
(0.3304) 
0.4038 
(0.0284) ** 
0.3870 
(0.0573) * 
1.2227 
( 0.0002) *** 
1.0588 
( 0.0003) *** 
-0.2512 
(0.0826) * 
-0.2169 
(0.1446) 
LEV 
-5.7713 
(0.0000) *** 
-5.5237 
(0.0000) *** 
-9.7717 
(0.0000) *** 
-5.9960 
(0.0001) *** 
-3.4731 
(0.0012) *** 
-3.7869 
(0.0003) *** 
-1.9885 
(0.0000) *** 
-2.3085 
(0.0000) *** 
Adj. R2 0.8903 0.9236 0.7721 0.7893 0.8356 0.8643 0.8977 0.8977 
F  32.2029
*** 47.4544*** 13.3281*** 14.6281*** 19.8591*** 24.6307*** 35.2701*** 35.2573*** 
D-W  2.2894 2.2996 2.2163 2.1823 2.4385 2.3730 2.2935 2.3219 
 
Panel B: Empirical Model (2) – ROA as the dependent variable 
 
High-Complexity/ 
Large-Scale 
Low-Complexity/ 
Small-Scale 
High-Complexity/ 
Small-Scale 
Low-Complexity/ 
Large-Scale 
 Mode A Mode B Mode A Mode B Mode A Mode B Mode A Mode B 
ISR 
-0.1835 
(0.0000) *** 
 
0.4937 
( 0.0000) *** 
 
0.7020 
( 0.0000) *** 
 
0.3173 
( 0.0000) *** 
 
ISD  
-0.0920 
(0.0013) *** 
 
0.1604 
( 0.0001) *** 
 
0.6192 
( 0.0000) *** 
 
0.0625 
( 0.0000) *** 
FIS 
0.0030 
( 0.2469) 
0.0030 
( 0.2652) 
-0.0124 
(0.0159) ** 
-0.0098 
(0.0625) * 
0.0086 
( 0.1007)  
0.0137 
( 0.0606) * 
0.0032 
( 0.0103)  
0.0004 
( 0.1802) 
DUA 
-0.0066 
(0.5319) 
-0.0063 
(0.5472) 
0.0015 
( 0.7802) 
0.0046 
( 0.3678) 
0.0777 
( 0.0000) *** 
0.0876 
( 0.0000) *** 
-0.0036 
(0.0001) *** 
-0.0017 
(0.0423) ** 
LEV 
-0.2490 
(0.0000) *** 
-0.2368 
(0.0000) *** 
-0.4758 
(0.0000) *** 
-0.3215 
(0.0000) *** 
-0.3457 
(0.0000) *** 
-0.3544 
(0.0000) *** 
-0.0598 
(0.0000) *** 
-0.0639 
(0.0000) *** 
Adj. R2 0.8098 0.8126 0.9520 0.9469 0.7822 0.7576 0.9324 0.8831 
F 17.3684
*** 17.6658*** 73.1788*** 65.8522*** 14.3310*** 12.5962*** 54.8526*** 30.4927*** 
D-W  2.3759 2.3530 2.5018 2.4673 2.5257 2.4191 2.2471 2.2872 
 
This table shows the regression results based on Empirical Model (1) and (2). The number before the (  ) is 
the coefficient; the number within the (  ) is the p-value. *, **, and *** denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significant 
level respectively.  
 
In general, the results of the two empirical models are quite consistent, revealing that the relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance varies among industrial settings. 
 
Both empirical models present negative ISR coefficients, negative ISD coefficients with statistical 
significance, and positive FIS coefficients in high-complexity/large-scale setting, implying support on Hypothesis 1.   
 
Both empirical models present positive ISR coefficients, and positive ISD coefficients and negative FIS 
coefficients with statistical significance in low-complexity/small-scale setting, implying support on Hypothesis 2.  
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The empirical results on DUA show a different tendency between large-scale and small-scale companies. 
For large-scale companies, the coefficients of DUA are all negative, while the DUA coefficients of small-scale 
companies are all positive. The empirical results on LEV are consistently negative for all the tested industrial 
settings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study examined the empirical relationship between insider ownership and firm performance in 
Taiwan, where the agency problem is typically based on conflicting interests between inside owners (inside 
directors) and outside shareholders. Based on resource dependence theory, this study argued that the relationship in 
concern might vary among diverse industrial settings. The empirical results supported this argument, showing that 
high insider shareholding exerts a positive effect in a high-complexity and large-scale setting, and a negative effect 
in a low-complexity and small-scale setting. Accordingly, this study contributes a new aspect to this discussion, 
arguing that the positive convergence-of-interests effect and the negative entrenchment effect can coexist in various 
industrial settings. This argument implies considering contextual-fitness in searching for effective regulations of 
corporate governance. In addition, the empirical results of this study provide a reference for the debate on the 
appropriateness of stock options and other equity-related items in director/executive pay packages, which is a widely 
adopted but controversial practice.  
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